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Abstract
Recent quantitative trade models treat import tariffs as pure cost shifters so that their
effects are similar to iceberg trade costs. We introduce revenue-generating import tariffs,
which act as demand shifters, into the framework of Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-
Clare (2012), and generalize their gains from trade equation. Our formula permits easy
quantification based on countries’ observed degrees of openness, tariff revenues, and on the
gravity elasticities of tariffs and icebergs. Export selection drives a wedge between these two
elasticities and matters for welfare gains. However, in all model variants, an analysis based
on iceberg costs necessarily underestimates the true gains from trade relative to autarky.
Our quantitative exercise suggests that the bias can be numerically significant. For countries
with relatively high tariffs, our formula predicts 30-60% larger gains from trade when iceberg
trade costs and/or tariffs are liberalized as compared to a pure reduction of iceberg trade
costs.
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1 Introduction
Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012, henceforth ACR) provide a simple formula that
allows computing the welfare gains relative to autarky based on a single statistic, the observed
share of a country’s trade with itself, and on a single parameter, the trade elasticity obtained
from a gravity equation. That formula holds in a class of popular one-sector models.1 While the
required trade elasticity may have different structural interpretations in the different models, it
is always the trade flow elasticity of iceberg trade costs.
Two main conclusions emerge from ACR’s analysis: (i) The novel features stressed in the
recent literature–imperfect competition and the presence of an extensive margin–have no extra
role to play for the ex-post analysis of trade liberalization scenarios. So, the richer micro-
level detail contained in new trade models “has not added much” to the gains from trade. (ii)
Applying their formula to the US, ACR show that the gains from trade obtained from the class
of models encompassed by their analysis are quantitatively rather small. Going from autarky
to the status quo leads to welfare gains of 0.7 to 1.4% of GDP.
To obtain these results, ACR restrict the allowed exogenous variation to changes in iceberg
trade costs, foreign labor endowments, or fixed market access costs. In this paper, we extend the
analysis to import tariffs. We show that ACR’s conclusion (i) requires qualification. Conditional
on a country’s observed trade share, the welfare gains from trade liberalization are the same
across models only if the gravity elasticities of iceberg trade costs and of tariffs coincide. This
is the case in the Armington (1969), Krugman (1980) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) models.
In contrast, the two elasticities generally differ in the Melitz (2003) model.2 It follows that
the presence of a selection channel combined with monopolistic competition has a quantitative
bearing on the gains from trade.
In all models considered, tariffs change the welfare formula and therefore also affect con-
clusion (ii). For the quantitative exercise, besides the iceberg trade costs elasticity, one also
1The frameworks covered include the Armington (1969), Krugman (1980), Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz
(2003) models. Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2013) provide an excellent overview on how the simple welfare
formula extends to cover models with multiple sectors, intermediate goods, and multiple factors of production.
2They coincide only if one treats tariffs as cost shifters, so that they increase marginal costs for the producer.
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requires the trade flow elasticity of tariffs, and, besides the trade share, one also requires the
share of tariff revenue in total GDP. We find that the ACR formula necessarily underestimates
the gains from trade relative to autarky: in the presence of non-zero tariffs and tariff revenue,
the calculated gains from trade are always larger when accounting for revenue-generating tariffs
as compared to a situation where tariffs are assumed to be absent.
The generalized welfare formula can be brought to the data as easily as ACR’s original
formula. Using the same calibration strategy as ACR, and even concentrating on models in
which tariffs and iceberg trade costs feature the same gravity elasticity, we find that tariffs can
matter very significantly: for example, in the year 2000, the specification only accounting for
iceberg trade costs underpredicts the gains from trade for Australia by 34.5 to 51.2%, for Korea
by 21.6 to 35.3% and for the U.S. by 8 to 14.8%, where the ranges result from different choices
of trade elasticities.
ACR acknowledge that “... our main welfare formula would need to be modified to cover the
case of tariffs. In particular, the results derived ... ignore changes in tariff revenues, which may
affect real income both directly and indirectly (through the entry and exit of firms).”3 In this
paper we propose such a modified formula. The fact that iceberg trade costs and tariffs may
have quite different effects on outcomes has been discussed in various papers but, to the best
of our knowledge, the literature does not yet offer a comparative quantitative perspective à la
ACR. Cole (2012) uses the framework of Chaney (2008) to show that the trade flow elasticity of
tariffs is larger than that of iceberg trade costs. He argues that estimates derived from variables
such as distance may underestimate the trade-enhancing effects of tariff reforms. We show that
the different welfare effects derive more from the fact that tariffs generate revenue rather than
from differences in elasticities.
Result (i) of ACR has prompted responses from the CGE literature. Balistreri, Hillberry,
and Rutherford (2011) point out that “[revenue-generating tariffs rather than iceberg trade costs]
can generate differences in the Melitz formulation relative to a perfect competition model” (p.
96). Summarizing Balistreri and Markusen (2009), they furthermore argue that “removing rent-
3See ACR (2012, footnote 33). Moreover, in their analysis of tariff reform in Costa Rica, Arkolakis, Costinot
and Rodriguez-Clare (2008) model trade reform as lower iceberg trade costs. They write: “One drawback of the
model we present here is that we treat tariffs as transportation costs”.
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generating tariffs have different effects in monopolistic competition versus Armington models,
because optimal tariffs are different”(p. 96). These findings are based on simulations. We
provide an analytical proof that the first assertion holds and show why it does so. It entirely
depends on the difference between the iceberg trade costs and the tariff elasticities in the Melitz
(2003) model. The second assertion, in contrast, is not generally true, since, for example, the
Krugman (1980) and the Armington (1969) models do admit identical welfare expressions.
Also, result (ii) of ACR has triggered substantial further work. One debate relates to the
role of pro competitive gains from trade. Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodriguez-Clare
(2012) show for a single-sector Melitz (2003) model with Pareto distributed productivities and
variable markups that pro-competitive gains from trade are negative. Edmond, Midrigan and
Xi (2012) use a multi-sector framework with oligopolistic competition and come to opposite
conclusions. Another strand of research highlights the role of cross-industry differences in trade
elasticities. Ossa (2012a) shows that a multi-sector Armington framework yields substantially
larger aggregate welfare gains than a single-sector model. Moreover, ACR have already noticed
the role of multiple sectors for their result (i). In such an environment, some sectors have higher
gains under monopolistic competition than under perfect competition and other sectors have
lower gains. The aggregate welfare effect depends on sectoral weights and is ambiguous. In
the presence of intermediate goods the gains from trade are always larger under monopolistic
competition than under perfect competition.4
Our work is related to two more areas of research. First, recent quantitative trade models
have acknowledged the role of tariffs besides iceberg trade costs. For example, Alvarez and
Lucas (2007) use the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model to study the effects of tariff reform. Ossa
(2012b) studies optimal tariffs and tariff wars in an extension of the Krugman (1980) model.
Caliendo and Parro (2012) provide a quantitative analysis of tariff liberalization in the context
of NAFTA and stress the role of input-output linkages across sectors. While these models study
tariffs, they do not make the role of tariffs for ACR’s results (i) and (ii) explicit. This is the
focus of the present study. Second, our analysis links to the structural econometric estimation
4ACR also show that the gravity elasticity of trade cost is not sufficient to compute welfare gains in the
presence of multiple sectors or intermediate goods.
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of gravity models since these deliver the elasticities that turn out so crucial. Separate estimation
of the iceberg and tariff elasticities is difficult. The problem is that iceberg trade costs are not
directly observed and that tariff levels are likely to be endogenous. However, Crozet and Koenig
(2010) have developed a method to estimate the parameters underlying the tariff and iceberg
trade cost elasticities without knowledge of trade frictions by using firm-level data.
We have structured the remainder of this paper as follows: Section 2 introduces the model
setup and explains how the introduction of tariffs alters the ACR framework. Section 3 charac-
terizes welfare in the presence of tariffs. Using observed openness and tariff revenue, Section 4
shows that the gains from trade can be severely underestimated when the variation in openness
is assumed to be due only to changes in iceberg trade costs while the reality does feature tariffs.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Import tariffs in quantitative trade models
2.1 Preferences, technology, trade costs, and market structure
We introduce import tariffs into quantitative trade models à la ACR. We focus on four particular
models that satisfy the primitive assumptions and macro-level restrictions outlined in ACR: (i)
a simple Armington model, (ii) Eaton and Kortum (2002) as an example of a Ricardian model,
(iii) the Krugman (1980) monopolistic competition model and, (iv) the Melitz (2003) model
with Pareto-distributed productivities and foreign market access cost in terms of foreign labor.5








where Ωi is the set of differentiated varieties available in country i, qi [ω] is the quantity of variety
ω consumed in country i and σ = 1/ (1− ρ) > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution.6 The
5Expressing foreign market access costs in terms of foreign labor provides a gravity equation that obeys a
particularly tractable functional form. In some applications, it is possible to nest the Krugman (1980) model
within the Krugman (1980) model.
6We use square brackets to denote functional relationships.
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Technology and trade costs. Labor is the only factor of production and is supplied inelas-
tically at quantity Li and price wi. Output is linear in labor, and productivity may or may
not differ across firms, with bi denoting the minimum productivity level. International trade is
subject to frictions while intranational trade is frictionless. In all models considered, exporting
from i to j involves iceberg trade costs τ ij , where τ ii = 1. Moreover, in Melitz (2003) there are
fixed market access costs, assumed to be in units of the destination country’s labor, that have
to be paid to serve the home or the foreign market.
Structure of product markets. There are two types of market structures: perfect compe-
tition and monopolistic competition with free entry. In both situations, firms take wages and
aggregate variables as given. With perfect competition, fixed innovation and market access costs
are zero. With monopolistic competition, in contrast, firms have to pay to obtain blueprints for
production. The allocation of these potentially heterogeneous blueprints across firms is random.
Tariffs. The key difference to ACR is that each country j may impose an ad valorem tariff
tji ≥ 1 on its imports from country i, where tii = 1. We assume that tariff revenue is redis-
tributed lump-sum to consumers. As opposed to iceberg trade costs, a tariff distorts consumption
decisions towards domestic goods but does not entail loss in transit.
2.2 Macro-level restrictions and the gravity equation
In their analysis, ACR impose three restrictions whose key role is to ensure that the framework
described above gives rise to a gravity equation, i.a., a representation of bilateral trade flows
where elasticities are constant. The first restriction, R1, requires that trade is balanced on a
multilateral level; the second, R2, mandates that aggregate gross profits are proportional to
aggregate revenue, and the third, R3’, puts a functional form on the gravity equation.
R2 needs no further qualification in the context of our exercise. R1, the balanced trade
condition, warrants a comment. In the presence of tariffs, it does not imply that aggregate firm
revenue and aggregate consumer spending are the same. To see this, let Xij denote the value of
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country j′s total imports from country i in domestic prices (i.e., gross of tariff, gross of iceberg










, for all j. (2)
Aggregate revenue accruing to firms is given by Rj ≡
∑n
i=1Xji/tij , while, with tariff income,
consumer’s aggregate expenditure is Xj ≡
∑n
i=1Xij . Hence, balanced trade does not imply
Xj = Rj , a restriction heavily employed by ACR.
R3’ makes a restriction on functional forms so that trade flow equations resulting from the
model are similar to known gravity model forms. We employ a similar, albeit slightly more














which accommodates the presence of tariffs. Dividing by Xjj eliminates income Xj and the
multilateral resistance term à la Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). χij collects constants
different from iceberg trade costs τ ij and tariffs tji. Ni is the mass of firms potentially active in
country i. That mass is endogenously determined, but due to R1 and R2, Ni is proportional to
exogenous labor endowment Li so that Ni does not change in a comparative statics exercise on
τ or t. The elasticities ε and ζ are constants with negative signs. In ACR, the term tζji is not
present.
ACR show that the Armington model by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) satisfy R1 to
R3’ without further restrictions. However, the Eaton-Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003) models
satisfy R2 and R3’ only under strong functional form assumptions on the distribution governing
within country heterogeneity that make sure that there is a unique trade elasticity despite
the presence of two margins of adjustment (intensive/extensive). The same functional form
restrictions are required in the presence of tariffs (i.e., the Fréchet distribution in the Eaton and
Kortum (2002) framework and the Pareto distribution in the Melitz (2003) case).
Table 1 provides the details on the structural interpretation of the tariff and iceberg trade
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cost elasticities from equation (3) for the different models considered in our analysis.7 γ > σ−1
is the (unique, positive) parameter of the Fréchet distribution governing unit labor requirements
in Eaton and Kortum (2002), and θ > σ − 1 is the (unique, positive) parameter of the Pareto
distribution governing firm-level productivity draws in a parameterized version of Melitz (2003).
Table 1: Iceberg trade costs and tariff elasticities in various trade models
Armington (1969), Eaton&Kortum Melitz (2003)
Krugman (1980) (2002)
Iceberg trade cost elasticity ε 1− σ −γ −θ
Tariff elasticity ζ 1− σ −γ 1− θ/ρ
In Armington (1969), Krugman (1980), and Eaton and Kortum (2002) we have ε = ζ since
we define export flows as inclusive of tariffs.8 In Melitz, we have ε > ζ since θ > σ − 1. The
Melitz-gravity equation collapses to the Krugman (1980) formulation if one considers the limiting
case θ → σ − 1. This effectively deactivates firm selection. This suggests that the discrepancy
between ε and ζ in the Melitz model originates from the existence of a firm-extensive margin.
The distinction between ε and ζ is important. To provide intuition, we follow Head and
Mayer (2013) and decompose trade elasticities in the Melitz framework into an intensive, an
extensive, and a compositional margin, such that9
d lnXij
d lnϑij




d lnϑij︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive margin
+ (σ − 1)
d lnϕ∗ij
d lnϑij︸ ︷︷ ︸
compositional margin
, (4)
where ϑij ∈ {τ ij , tji} and ϕ
∗
ij is the minimum productivity level required for a firm to cover the
fixed costs of foreign market presence. The intensive margin records changed import spending on
varieties already sold on the market of country i, holding the number of imported varieties and
the price distribution constant; the extensive margin relates to the change in the mass of foreign
exporters, holding sales constant; and the compositional margin describes the reallocation of
7See Appendix B for the detailed derivations.
8This is just a convention that somewhat eases notation in our framework. Writing trade flows net of tariffs
yields a gravity coefficient on tariffs of ε − 1, and requires rewriting the balanced trade condition. None of our
results would change.
9See Appendix D for full details on the derivation.
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spending resulting from changes in the price distribution holding the number of firms and firm-
level sales constant. Clearly, when all firms export, there are no extensive and compositional
margins. Elasticities ε and ζ coincide, since iceberg trade costs and tariffs increase the consumer
price of a variety in exactly the same way. For the same reason, even in the presence of additional
margins, the change in optimal demand for a single variety (i.e., the intensive margin) is exactly
the same regardless of whether prices change due to variation in τ ij or tji.
In contrast, tariffs and iceberg trade costs have different implications for firms’ revenues.
For given consumer demand, a producer has to increase output in response to a rise in iceberg
trade costs as τ ij units have to be produced for one unit to arrive. Compared to a change in the
tariff tji, which has no such effect on firm revenue, firm sales are higher compared to the same
change in τ ij ; with constant markups this leads to larger gross operating profits, motivating
the entry of less productive firms.10 In terms of the algebra of the Melitz (2003) model, these
considerations imply d lnϕ∗ij/d ln τ ij = 1 while d lnϕ
∗
ij/d ln tji = σ/(σ − 1). In absolute terms,
the effect of an increase in iceberg trade costs on the mass of foreign exporters is smaller than
the effect of an import tariff. Substituting into (4), it follows that ε > ζ.11
2.3 Identities







where Xij/tji is the value of imports from i exclusive of tariffs. The representative household
receives a share ηj ∈ [0, 1] of tariff revenue, the complementary share being wasted in the
10This most easily seen by comparing import zero cutoff profit conditions for the case of a tariff (see A.3.4 in
Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare, 2009) with the more standard iceberg case.
11In the Appendix, we show that this result does not depend on whether fixed foreign market entry costs are
in terms of domestic or foreign labor. Neither does it depend on whether or not tariff revenue is successfully
rebated to consumers. One obtains ε = ζ even under firm selection if tariffs are treated as cost shifters rather
than demand shifters. This would amount to the situation where the exporter treats tariffs as marginal costs
and applies the markup to this enlarged cost base. Then, tariffs act exactly like iceberg trade costs. However,
this configuration is unrealistic; it is also not in line with the usual interpretation: tariffs drive a wedge between
producer and consumer prices. This is what leads to ε > ζ.
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redistribution process.12 With η < 1, import tariffs directly consume resources as do iceberg
trade costs. An important difference, however, is that iceberg trade costs waste resources of the
exporting country, whereas import tariffs waste resources of the importing country.
Aggregate expenditure Xj (equal to aggregate income) is made up of labor income wjLj and
effective tariff revenue ηjTj
Xj = wjLj + ηjTj = µjwjLj , (6)














The multiplier µj arises because spending labor income on imports generates tariff income
which is part of aggregate income.13 The tariff multiplier is inactive if a country does not impose
import tariffs (Tj = 0) or if tariff revenue is completely wasted (ηj = 0). Equation (6) greatly
simplifies our analysis for two reasons. First, there is no need to keep track of bilateral trade
flows and bilateral tariffs. All relevant information is represented by the share of aggregate tariff
revenue in aggregate income, which is easily observable. Second, it allows expressing aggregate
labor income as a function of total income and the share of tariff revenue in aggregate income
(GDP). Since labor is the only factor of production, and profits are fully competed away by free
entry, firm revenues are paid out to workers as labor income wjLj . Hence,






where dividing by tij takes care of Xji being defined as inclusive of tariffs.
12Neary (1994) studies distortionary taxation of firms under oligopolistic competition in an international export
subsidy game. Alternatively, one can read ηj as the share of tariff revenue which is not wasted on rent-seeking
activities; see Schröder and Sørensen (2011).
13Although we limit our analysis to import tariffs tji > 1, our model can easily be extended to import subsidies
tji < 1 . A tariff multiplier µj larger than unity obtains if net tariff revenue is positive.
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Expenditure share. ACR express country j´s welfare as a function of the share of expenditure














That share is an inverse measure of j′s openness also referred to as its degree of “autarkiness”;
1− λjj would then be its openness.
14
3 Welfare analysis
3.1 A generalized formula for the gains from trade
We are interested in the effects of import tariffs on welfare. Welfare is given by the per capita








where the second equality makes use of (6). Importantly, welfare not only depends on real labor
income, but also on redistributed real tariff revenue.
As outlined above, the tariff multiplier µj is computed from aggregate tariff revenue as a
share of aggregate income. Real labor income is essentially unobserved. In Appendix C, however,
we show that the change in real labor income can be expressed in a multiplicative fashion as a












where as in ACR x̂ ≡ x′/x denotes the change in any variable x between the initial and the new
equilibrium.15 Three observations stand out. First, with ε = ζ the change in real income can
14In the following, with some abuse of wording, we similarly refer to changes in autarkiness or openness when
describing changes in λii.
15The intuition behind the result is the same as in ACR. Our proof, however, is simpler as we do not make use
of “hat” algebra. The reason is that we focus on three particular examples of quantitative trade models and not
on the whole class of models.
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be computed from the change in the share of domestic expenditure as in ACR. Second, with
ε 6= ζ computation of the change in real labor income becomes more complex since, additionally,
information on the change in the tariff multiplier is necessary. The reason is that tariff income
affects the mass of foreign firms exporting to country j, a margin which has repercussions on
the price index and which is not active in the other models.16 Finally, the change in real labor
income does not represent the change in utility of country j’s representative consumer as tariff
income has to be taken into account. Combining equations (10) and (11) leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 In the considered trade models (Armington (1969), Krugman (1980), Eaton
and Kortum (2002), and Melitz (2003)), the change in real income associated with a change in








Conditional on observed λ̂jj , µ̂j and given trade elasticities ε, ζ, Ŵj is larger in the Melitz (2003)
model (where ζ/ε > 1) than in the other models (where ζ/ε = 1).
Proof. Immediately follows from combing equations (10) and (11).
Proposition 1 states that for the set of quantitative trade models considered, the change in
welfare can be computed from the change in the tariff multiplier and the change in the domestic
expenditure share, given the elasticities ε and ζ. The formula collapses to the one presented by
ACR in the absence of tariffs, i.e., ŴACRj = λ̂
1/ε
jj . As in ARC, Proposition 1 can be used to infer
welfare consequences of past episodes of trade liberalization. In particular, one can very easily
compute the gains from trade relative to autarky, for which λjj = 1 and µj = 1.
As long as one imposes the restriction on gravity parameters ε = ζ, the exact micro founda-
tion of the models does not matter for the size of welfare gains, even in the presence of tariffs.
However, this isomorphism breaks in the Melitz (2003) model where ε > ζ. Hence, the combi-
nation of tariff revenue, firm selection and monopolistic competition matters for the gains from
16Although the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model features selection, the mass of firms active in international
trade has no particular role due to perfect competition. In the special case in which Melitz (2003) replicates the
Krugman (1980) model, i.e., θ → σ − 1, it also yields ζ → ε.
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trade.17
Proposition 1 also characterizes welfare effects of variable trade costs that consume resources
of the importing country rather than resources of the exporting country. With ηj = 0, tariff
revenue is completely wasted, and the tariff multiplier µj is fixed at unity. Then, the welfare
formula collapses to the one presented by ACR. So, in the considered quantitative trade models,
the welfare effect of a shock on variable trade cost that consume resources either of the exporting
or the importing country is simply Ŵj = λ̂
1
ε
jj . This observation implies that the formula presented
in ACR characterizing the effect of iceberg type trade costs also applies to the liberalizing
(exporting) country.18
3.2 Ignoring tariffs leads to underestimation of the true gains from trade
In general, the ACR welfare formula may over- or underestimate the true gains from trade.
Conditional on the observed change in the domestic expenditure share, the ACR formula over-
estimates the welfare gains if µ̂j < 1. This overestimation occurs if the share of tariff income in
aggregate income has fallen during liberalization. If, on the other hand, this share has risen, the
ARC formula underestimates the gains from trade reform. In particular, we show that the ACR
formula underestimates the gains from trade in the case of moving from autarky to the observed
equilibrium. By definition, trade costs (either iceberg trade costs or tariffs) are prohibitive under
autarky, such that the economy raises no tariff revenue in the initial equilibrium.
How sensitive is the underestimation of the welfare gains from trade for a given domestic
expenditure share and given tariff multiplier to the changes in the elasticities ε and ζ and their
determinants σ, γ, and θ? We answer this question in the following proposition.19
Proposition 2 Ignoring tariff revenue, the ACR formula underestimates the true gains from
17With ε = ζ, firm selection stops operating in the Melitz (2003) model.
18ACR focus on welfare effects in the importing country.
19For the purpose of understanding the nature of the underestimation problem, we treat both λjj and µj as
exogenous, while they are, of course, endogenous variables in the model. We do not report general equilibrium
comparative statics results.
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(a) κj is increasing in the share of domestic expenditure λjj and in the tariff multiplier µj.
(b) If iceberg trade cost and tariff elasticities coincide as in Armington (1969), Eaton and
Kortum (2002), and Krugman (1980), κj is decreasing in the trade elasticity.
(c) If iceberg trade cost and tariff elasticities are given by respectively ε = −θ and ζ = 1− θ/ρ
as in Melitz (2003), κj is decreasing in the degree of productivity dispersion 1/θ and in the
elasticity of substitution σ.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Proposition 2 implies that in the Armington case and in Krugman as a special case of the
Melitz model, underestimation becomes more severe the larger the elasticity of substitution.
In the Eaton-Kortum case, underestimation falls in the degree of heterogeneity across goods
in countries’ labor efficiency levels.20 In the Melitz framework, κj falls in the elasticity of
substitution, which contrasts the findings for the Armington and the Krugman model.21 The
effect of productivity dispersion is a priori unclear, as the domestic expenditure share is smaller
than one, whereas the tariff multiplier is larger than one. We show in Appendix E that κj
is unambiguously increasing in θ. Hence, for given λjj and µj , higher productivity dispersion
(lower θ) leads to less severe underestimation.
3.3 Effects of symmetric liberalization
In order to build intuition for what happens if trade is liberalized along both margins, iceberg
trade costs and tariffs, we characterize the tariff multiplier and analyze the gains from trade in
a situation. For η = 1, we consider the welfare effects of reducing (i) iceberg trade costs for
given tariffs, and (ii) tariffs for given iceberg trade costs. It turns out that allowing for variation
in iceberg trade costs but fixing tariffs retains the convex relationship between welfare and the
20Recall that γ is inversely related to heterogeneity.
21Note that σ and ρ are positively correlated.
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share of domestic expenditure known from ACR. Quite to the contrary, dismantling tariffs yields
a concave relationship. In the data, of course, we see a combination of both.
To derive our theoretical argument, we employ a framework with two symmetric countries.
In this setting, we can abstract from terms-of-trade considerations. Moreover, we can express
the tariff and therefore the tariff multiplier as a function of the domestic expenditure share,
which allows for a simple graphical representation of the gains from trade.
The tariff multiplier. With two symmetric countries, the tariff multiplier can be written as
µ =
t
λ (t− 1) + 1
, (12)
which follows from the definition of tariff revenue T given by equation (5). Totally differentiating
this expression, we obtain
d lnµ =
1− λ
λ (t− 1) + 1
d ln t−
λ (t− 1)
λ (t− 1) + 1
d lnλ, (13)
where the first term on the right hand side of the equation represents a tariff rate effect. For
a given domestic expenditure share, the tariff multiplier is increasing in the tariff. The third
term is a tax base effect. For a given tariff, the tariff multiplier is decreasing in the domestic
expenditure share. Evaluated at the free trade equilibrium, t = 1, the tax base effect is inactive,
but the tariff rate effect amounts to (1− λ) d ln t. Under autarky, λ = 1, the tariff rate effect is
inactive, but the tax base effect is given by (1− 1/t) d lnλ.
Exploiting the functional form restriction on gravity (3), for fixed non-tariff barriers the
change in the domestic expenditure share and the change in the tariff are linked by
d lnλ = − (1− λ) ζd ln t. (14)
Substituting this expression back into equation (13), the tariff t∗ that maximizes the tariff






where the inequality follows from recalling that ζ is a negative elasticity.22 The µ-schedule
follows the logic of a Laffer curve. Tariff revenues rise in the tariff rate for small tariff rates
up to its maximum and then fall to zero as the tariff rate grows larger and larger. The extent
to which the ACR formula underestimates the welfare gains from trade relative to autarky is
therefore larger for intermediate values of the domestic expenditure share.
Given the absence of terms-of-trade considerations, the welfare-maximizing tariff is given by
to = 1. Therefore, the tariff that maximizes the tariff multiplier is larger than the tariff that
maximizes welfare.
Iceberg trade costs in the presence of tariffs. Consider now a change in iceberg trade











λ (t− 1) + 1
)
. (15)
Recall that ε and ζ are negative elasticities. Welfare is therefore strictly decreasing in λ. The
first term in brackets on the right hand side represents an import price effect, and the second
term is a tax base effect. Clearly there is no tax base effect in the absence of tariffs, t = 1. In
this case, the formula collapses to the ACR result, and welfare is strictly convex in λ. Using
equation (15), we show in Appendix F that welfare is still convex in λ in the presence of tariffs.
Lowering tariffs. Consider a change in tariffs for given iceberg trade costs τ̄ . Using equation
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where as in equation (15) the first term is the import price effect, and the second term is a
tax base effect. These terms are accompanied by the tariff rate effect. Evaluated at free trade
equilibrium, t = 1, the second term in brackets disappears, and the third term simplifies to
unity. Hence, the import price effect is exactly offset by the tax rate effect, and a small tariff
22The tariff-multiplier maximizing tariff t∗ follows from setting d lnµ/d lnλ to zero.
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therefore has no net welfare consequences. Evaluated at the autarky equilibrium, t → ∞, the
tariff rate effect is absent, and the tax base effect converges to −ζ. Clearly, there would be no
tax base effect if autarky was generated through prohibitive non-tariff barriers.
Using equation (16), we show in Appendix F that welfare is concave in the domestic ex-
penditure share when variation in the expenditure share is solely driven by changes in import
tariffs.
Proposition 3 In a symmetric two-country world with tariffs t and iceberg trade costs τ
(a) variation in τ for given t yields a convex downward sloping relationship between welfare
and autarkiness λ, while
(b) variation in t for given τ generates a concave, downward sloping relationship.
Proof. See Appendix F.23
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the two polar cases, with autarky welfare normalized to
unity. Clearly, since welfare is the same for the two cases in either autarky (when either τ or t or
both are prohibitively high) or free trade (when trade is entirely free), for values of λ ∈ [0.5, 1] ,
the concave curve has to lie above the convex one, so that a lens opens up. The height of the
lens describes the potential maximum amount of underestimation that arises when all variation
in λ is attributed to changes in τ .
The existence of the lens is most easily rationalized by the fact that, at λ = 0.5, a small tariff
has no welfare implications while small iceberg trade costs yield a welfare loss. In contrast, in the
neighborhood of autarky (where λ = 1), things are different. Imagine a further marginal increase
in τ . This brings the economy even closer to autarky, but also implies that less resources are
lost in transit. In contrast, a further increase in t, which results in the same marginal increase
of λ, drives tariff revenue to almost zero. Hence, the absolute value of the slope of the welfare
function is higher when t changes than when τ changes.
Figure 1 generalizes easily to the case of asymmetric countries. In such a setup, in all the
23We provide formal proofs for the Eaton-Kortum (2002) and the Melitz (2003) model, which respectively nest
the Armington model and the Krugman (1980) model.
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Figure 1: Gains from trade and share of domestic expenditure: Iceberg trade costs versus
tariffs
Share of domestic  
expenditure ߣ 







models considered a strictly positive optimal tariff exists.24 This means that there is some
λo ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes welfare when openness changes due to t. In other words, the welfare
function under variation of t must be concave for a maximum at λo to exist. The welfare function
under variation of τ remains convex, as before. Hence, a lens opens up and our underestimation
result appears.
4 Quantitative exercise
As a final step in this paper, we bring our Propositions 1 and 2 to the data with the aim to
quantify the role of tariff income for the size of the gains from trade. We require data on domestic
expenditure shares λjj and on tariff multipliers µj for as many countries as possible. We also
need to know the iceberg trade cost elasticity ε and the tariff elasticity ζ. To enable comparison
with ACR, we stick as close as possible to their quantitative exercise.
ACR suggest to compute λjj based on import penetration ratios defined as imports over
gross output rather than GDP. These two measures differ as the former includes imported
24See Gros (1987) for the case of the Krugman (1980) model, Alvarez and Lucas (2007) for the Eaton and
Kortum (2002) model, and Felbermayr, Jung and Larch (2013) for the Melitz (2003) model.
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intermediates while the second does not. Imported intermediates also appear in imports. So,
either one computes λjj based on gross imports and gross output, or on the value added content
of imports and GDP.25 ACR use the former approach. Note that dividing gross imports by
GDP would result in lower values of λjj , leading to overestimation of welfare gains. OECD
input-output tables are available for the years 1995, 2000, and 2005. For the year 2000, we have
information on gross output from OECD input-output tables for 41 countries.
In a sensitivity analysis, we contrast our results to those based on the value added content
of imports in domestic final demand in percent of GDP to compute openness. Data stem from
the OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added database which provides information for a subset of 36
countries for the year 2005.
Tariff revenue as a share of gross output is computed from combining trade-weighted average
tariffs from the World Development Indicators data base with information on imports and gross
output from the input-output tables. For six countries, the year 2000 average tariff is missing.
We use the averaged value from the years 1999 and 2001 instead.26
Finally, we need information on ε and ζ. Ideally, to obtain estimates for these parameters,
we would have data on iceberg trade costs and tariffs. In the cases of the Armington (1969),
Krugman (1980) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) models, one would estimate a gravity equation
under the assumption ε = ζ. In the Melitz (2003) case, we have ε 6= ζ, and so one would
have to estimate a gravity model and allow parameters to differ. This paper is not about the
consistent estimation of trade elasticities, which is a non-trivial task.27 Rather, we demonstrate
the quantitative importance of taking observed tariffs into account based on estimates taken
from the literature and staying as close to ACR as possible. Hence, we set the elasticity to
either −5 or −10 when the underlying model mandates ε = ζ. For the Melitz (2003) model, we
use recent estimates by Crozet and Koenig (2010) obtained from structural estimation based
on firm-level data. They report an elasticity of substitution of σ = 2.25 and a Pareto decay
parameter of θ = 3.09. These estimates imply ε = −3.09 and ζ = −4.562.
25Imports are evaluated at c.i.f. prices (cost, insurance, freight); see OECD Input-Output Database edition
2006 - STI Working Paper 2006/8.
26The six countries are: India, Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam.
27E.g., one would have to deal with the possibility that tariffs are endogenous.
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In our 41 country sample, in the year 2000, import penetration ratios vary between 5.2%
in Japan at the lower end to 53.9% in Luxembourg at the higher end. The average is 22.9%
and the standard deviation across our country sample is 11.7%.28 The trade-weighted average
import tariff varies between 1.1% in Norway and 27.5% in India. The average tariff rate is 4.2%;
the standard deviation is 5.3%. So, in 2000, tariffs are not negligible for a considerable number
of countries. Similarly, in the data, there is substantial variation in the share of tariffs in gross
output; it ranges between 0.1% (Japan, USA) and Vietnam (5,2%) with a mean of 0.8% and a
standard deviation of 0.8%.
The tariff multiplier, computed according to equation (6), ranges from 1.0014 for less open
and low-tariff countries like the US and Japan to 1.0548 for Vietnam, a country that, in the year
2000, imposes an import tariff of about 18% but is still relatively open. The mean multiplier
is 1.0079 and the standard deviation is 1.0057. The tariff multipliers seem to be very small in
size. However, since the gains from trade are rather small as well (as demonstrated by ACR),
the amount of underestimation can still be sizeable.
Table 2 reports welfare gains from trade relative to autarky for the models in which iceberg
trade cost and tariff elasticities ε = ζ coincide. As ACR, we set ε ∈ {−5,−10}. Following
ACR, the columns entitled “Icebergs only” assume that, counterfactually, tariff revenue in all
countries is zero. Gains from trade therefore can only stem from a reduction in iceberg trade
costs. This case yields gains from trade that replicate the findings of ACR for the US and also
turn out very small for many other countries. For the conservative case of ε = ζ = −5, the
mean value for the gains from trade is 5.6% with a standard deviation of 3.6%. The columns
entitled “Icebergs&tariffs ” refer to the situation where tariff revenue, as observed, is taken into
account. Gains from trade can originate from a reduction in iceberg trade costs and/or tariffs.
As predicted by theory, in this case, the gains from trade are substantially larger: the mean is
6.4% and the standard deviation is 3.9%. The third column reports the degree by which the
ACR formula underestimates the true gains from trade. Our exercise suggests that the amount
of underestimation can be very substantial: for the case ε = ζ = −5 it can range as high as
57.7% in India, 45.7% in Vietnam or 41.7% in China. All these countries still have substantial
28Table 4 in the Appendix reports the full data.
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tariffs in place as of year 2000. The average amount of underestimation is 14.4%; the median is
8.9%.
When ignoring tariffs, the gains from trade fall by about 50% on average relative to the
conservative parametrization when a higher trade elasticity of ε = ζ = −10 is assumed. When
taking tariffs into account, the gains are also lower than under the baseline, but by less than
50%. The degree of underestimation goes up substantially in most countries: on average it is
now 23.3% instead of 14.4%. The bias appears very in the high-tariff countries discussed above.
However, underestimation appears important in some rich countries such as Australia (51.1%),
too.
Figure 2 reproduces the ACR welfare formula for ε = ζ = −5 as a function of λ. It also plots
the gains from trade in the presence of tariff revenue for the years of 1995 (filled circles), 2000
(empty circles), and 2005 (asterisks). As tariffs have come down over time, the underestimation
implied by the ACR formula has become smaller. The figure also shows that the difference
between the situation with iceberg trade costs only and the case with iceberg trade costs and
tariffs increases when the domestic expenditure share falls.
Table 3 turns to the case where ε ≥ ζ such as in the Melitz (2003) model. We employ
the parameter estimates provided by Crozet and Koenig (2010) which imply ε = −3.09 and
ζ = −4.562. To facilitate comparison, we report welfare gains under the assumption that both
elasticities were equal to ε. This special situation reproduces the Krugman (1980) situation
as a special case of the Melitz (2003) model. The column entitled “Icebergs only” shows the
associated gains when tariff revenue is ignored; the column entitled “Icebergs and tariffs” re-
ports the gains when the observed tariff revenue is taken into account, and the column entitled
“underestimation” provides the degree of underestimation incurred. Gains from trade appear
generally higher than in Table 2, where a higher trade elasticity (ε = −5) was used. The average
amount of underestimation goes down.
The final two columns of Table 3 impose ε = −3.09 and ζ = −4.562. Under this situation,
trade responds more strongly to tariffs than to iceberg trade costs. Given observed tariffs, lower
levels of iceberg trade costs are required to reproduce observed openness levels. This increases
the difference between our calibration and the ACR case with iceberg trade costs only. Hence, in
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Table 2: Gains from trade relative to autarky when iceberg trade costs and tariff elasticities
coincide (year 2000)
Trade elasticities: -5 Trade elasticities: -10
Icebergs Icebergs Under- Icebergs Icebergs Under-
only and tariffs estimation only and tariffs estimation
Australia 2.4% 3.6% 34.5% 1.2% 2.4% 51.2%
Austria 6.1% 6.7% 8.8% 3.0% 3.6% 15.9%
Belgium 10.0% 10.9% 8.3% 4.9% 5.7% 15.0%
Brazil 1.4% 2.3% 38.3% 0.7% 1.6% 55.3%
Bulgaria 5.1% 5.6% 8.9% 2.5% 3.0% 16.2%
Canada 5.0% 5.3% 5.6% 2.5% 2.8% 10.5%
China 1.8% 3.0% 41.7% 0.9% 2.1% 58.7%
Cyprus 9.7% 10.5% 8.3% 4.7% 5.6% 15.0%
Czech Republic 6.6% 7.2% 8.7% 3.2% 3.8% 15.8%
Denmark 6.1% 6.7% 8.7% 3.0% 3.6% 15.9%
Estonia 10.6% 11.5% 8.2% 5.2% 6.0% 14.8%
Finland 3.9% 4.3% 9.1% 2.0% 2.3% 16.5%
France 3.4% 3.7% 9.1% 1.7% 2.0% 16.6%
Germany 4.2% 4.6% 9.0% 2.1% 2.5% 16.4%
Greece 5.7% 6.2% 8.8% 2.8% 3.3% 16.0%
Hungary 9.2% 10.0% 8.4% 4.5% 5.3% 15.1%
India 1.7% 4.0% 57.7% 0.8% 3.1% 73.1%
Indonesia 3.5% 4.3% 19.6% 1.7% 2.6% 32.5%
Ireland 11.5% 12.5% 8.1% 5.6% 6.5% 14.6%
Italy 2.9% 3.2% 9.2% 1.5% 1.8% 16.8%
Japan 1.1% 1.2% 12.1% 0.5% 0.7% 21.6%
Korea 4.0% 5.1% 21.6% 2.0% 3.1% 35.3%
Luxembourg 16.7% 18.1% 7.5% 8.0% 9.3% 13.5%
Malta 16.5% 17.9% 7.5% 7.9% 9.2% 13.6%
Netherlands 8.3% 9.1% 8.5% 4.1% 4.8% 15.3%
New Zealand 3.3% 3.6% 10.4% 1.6% 2.0% 18.7%
Norway 4.0% 4.2% 4.7% 2.0% 2.2% 8.9%
Poland 3.9% 4.3% 9.1% 2.0% 2.3% 16.5%
Portugal 5.0% 5.5% 8.9% 2.5% 2.9% 16.2%
Romania 4.6% 5.0% 9.0% 2.3% 2.7% 16.3%
Russian Fed. 3.1% 4.4% 29.6% 1.6% 2.8% 45.5%
Slovak Republic 7.8% 8.5% 8.5% 3.8% 4.5% 15.5%
Slovenia 7.1% 7.8% 8.6% 3.5% 4.2% 15.6%
South Africa 3.1% 3.9% 18.4% 1.6% 2.3% 30.9%
Spain 3.8% 4.2% 9.1% 1.9% 2.2% 16.5%
Sweden 4.9% 5.4% 8.9% 2.4% 2.9% 16.2%
Switzerland 5.3% 5.6% 5.9% 2.6% 2.9% 11.0%
Turkey 3.7% 4.7% 20.1% 1.8% 2.8% 33.2%
United Kingdom 3.5% 3.9% 9.1% 1.8% 2.1% 16.6%
United States 1.6% 1.8% 8.0% 0.8% 0.9% 14.8%
Vietnam 7.0% 12.8% 45.7% 3.4% 9.1% 62.3%
Mean 5.6% 6.4% 14.4% 2.7% 3.6% 23.3%
Median 4.6% 5.1% 8.9% 2.3% 2.9% 16.2%
Std. Dev. 3.6% 3.9% 12.3% 1.7% 2.1% 15.8%
Icebergs only: Gains from trade stem from a pure reduction of iceberg trade costs. Icebergs and tariffs: Gains
from trade stem from a reduction of iceberg trade costs and/or tariffs that is consistent with observed shares of tariff
revenue in GDP. Underestimation: Percentage amount of underestimation of Icebergs only relative to Icebergs and
tariffs. In the conservative specification (Trade elasticities: −5), the iceberg only formula underestimates gains from
trade by 4.7% for Norway to 57.7% for India.
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Table 3: Gains from trade relative to autarky when iceberg trade cost and tariff elasticities
differ (year 2000).
Iceberg trade cost elasticity: -3.09
Tariff elasticity: -3.09 Tariff elasticity: -4.562
Icebergs Icebergs Under- Icebergs Under-
only and tariffs estimation and tariffs estimation
Australia 3.9% 5.2% 24.7% 5.8% 32.7%
Austria 10.0% 10.6% 5.7% 10.9% 8.2%
Belgium 16.6% 17.6% 5.4% 18.0% 7.8%
Brazil 2.3% 3.2% 27.8% 3.6% 36.3%
Bulgaria 8.3% 8.8% 5.8% 9.1% 8.3%
Canada 8.2% 8.5% 3.6% 8.7% 5.2%
China 2.9% 4.1% 30.8% 4.7% 39.7%
Cyprus 16.1% 17.0% 5.4% 17.5% 7.8%
Czech Republic 10.9% 11.5% 5.7% 11.8% 8.1%
Denmark 10.1% 10.7% 5.7% 11.0% 8.2%
Estonia 17.7% 18.7% 5.4% 19.1% 7.8%
Finland 6.4% 6.9% 5.9% 7.0% 8.4%
France 5.5% 5.8% 5.9% 6.0% 8.5%
Germany 6.8% 7.3% 5.8% 7.5% 8.4%
Greece 9.3% 9.9% 5.7% 10.2% 8.2%
Hungary 15.2% 16.1% 5.5% 16.5% 7.9%
India 2.8% 5.1% 45.8% 6.2% 55.7%
Indonesia 5.7% 6.6% 13.2% 7.0% 18.3%
Ireland 19.2% 20.3% 5.3% 20.8% 7.7%
Italy 4.8% 5.1% 5.9% 5.3% 8.5%
Japan 1.7% 1.9% 7.9% 2.0% 11.2%
Korea 6.6% 7.7% 14.7% 8.3% 20.3%
Luxembourg 28.5% 30.0% 5.0% 30.7% 7.2%
Malta 28.1% 29.6% 5.0% 30.3% 7.2%
Netherlands 13.8% 14.7% 5.5% 15.0% 8.0%
New Zealand 5.3% 5.7% 6.7% 5.9% 9.7%
Norway 6.6% 6.8% 3.0% 6.9% 4.4%
Poland 6.5% 6.9% 5.9% 7.0% 8.4%
Portugal 8.2% 8.7% 5.8% 8.9% 8.3%
Romania 7.5% 8.0% 5.8% 8.2% 8.4%
Russian Fed. 5.1% 6.5% 20.8% 7.1% 28.0%
Slovak Republic 12.9% 13.7% 5.6% 14.0% 8.0%
Slovenia 11.8% 12.5% 5.6% 12.8% 8.1%
South Africa 5.1% 5.9% 12.3% 6.2% 17.2%
Spain 6.2% 6.6% 5.9% 6.8% 8.4%
Sweden 8.1% 8.6% 5.8% 8.9% 8.3%
Switzerland 8.7% 9.0% 3.8% 9.2% 5.5%
Turkey 6.1% 7.1% 13.6% 7.5% 18.8%
United Kingdom 5.8% 6.2% 5.9% 6.3% 8.5%
United States 2.6% 2.8% 5.1% 2.9% 7.4%
Vietnam 11.5% 17.6% 34.7% 20.6% 44.3%
Mean 9.3% 10.1% 10.0% 10.5% 13.6%
Median 7.5% 8.0% 5.8% 8.3% 8.3%
Std. Dev. 6.1% 6.4% 9.6% 6.6% 11.9%
Icebergs only: Gains from trade stem from a pure reduction of iceberg trade costs. Icebergs and
tariffs: Gains from trade stem from a reduction of iceberg trade costs and/or tariffs that is consistent
with observed shares of tariff revenue in GDP. Underestimation: Percentage amount of underestimation
of Icebergs only relative to Icebergs and tariffs. In all columns, we set θ = 3.09, which implies a iceberg
trade cost elasticity of ε = −3.09. We set σ = 4.09 to obtain a tariff elasticity of ζ = −3.09 and σ = 2.25
implying a tariff elasticity of ζ = −4.562; see Crozet and Koenig (2010) for empirical evidence on θ = 3.09
and σ = 2.25. In the latter specification, the iceberg only formula underestimates gains from trade by
4.4% for Norway to 55.7% for India.
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Figure 2: Gains from trade relative to autarky: Icebergs only versus icebergs and tariffs
Icebergs only: Gains from trade stem from a pure reduction of iceberg trade costs. Icebergs and tariffs:
Gains from trade stem from a reduction of iceberg trade costs and/or tariffs that is consistent with observed
shares of tariff revenue in GDP. Data are given for the years 1995 (filled circles), 2000 (empty circles), and 2005
(asterisks).
the Melitz (2003) model, the approximation achieved from focusing on iceberg trade costs alone
is more inaccurate than in the other models considered. The average degree of underestimation
is about 13%, with peaks in countries such as India of more than 55%.
So far, results are based on import penetration ratios computed as imports over gross output.
An alternative route is to make use of the foreign value added content of imports in percent of
GDP. Table 5 in the Appendix contrasts these approaches for the year 2005 and for a specification
in which iceberg and tariff elasticities differ. In the year 2005, the mean tariff rate is about 2.8%,
which is considerably smaller than in 2000 (4.2%). In the majority of cases, the valued added
approach implies a larger degree of opennes and therefore a smaller domestic expenditure share
λjj . Accordingly, welfare gains are typically larger under the value added approach than under
the imports approach. Moreover, the bias of the ACR formula is smaller (8.7% versus 10.1%),
which is in line with part (a) of Proposition 2.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have revisited the welfare gains from trade for new trade models in the presence
of revenue generating ad valorem tariffs. Thereby, we extend the analysis of Arkolakis et al.
(ACR, 2012). We show analytically that the ex post gains from trade can be easily calculated
from data on the domestic expenditure and the share of tariff revenue in total income of a
country. Also, one needs estimates of the elasticities of trade flows with respect to iceberg trade
costs and tariffs. When these two elasticities coincide, the gains from trade do not depend on
the micro structure. However, in on leading model, the Melitz (2003) framework, the elasticities
differ. Given trade and tariff data, it follows that the welfare gains are larger in the Melitz
(2003) model than in other models (e.g., the Armington (1969), Krugman (1980) and Eaton
and Kortum (2002) models).
For all the considered new trade models, we find that neglecting tariff revenue necessarily
leads to an underestimation of the welfare gains from trade relative to autarky. The bias is
largest in economies characterized by high tariff revenue and high domestic expenditure shares.
For a sample of 41 countries observed at the year of 2000, we find that ignoring tariffs leads to an
underestimation of the true gains by 13-23% on average. This hides substantial cross-sectional
variance. The underestimation can be higher than 30% for Australia, but can be below 5% for
a country such as Norway.
Our results highlight the need for further research on at least two fronts. First, the structural
estimation of welfare gains in new trade models requires unbiased and consistent estimates of
both iceberg trade cost and tariff elasticities. Theory-consistent econometric exercises are still
rare and plagued by problems such as the lack of observability of iceberg trade costs and possible
endogeneity of average tariff rates. Second, the important differences between iceberg trade
cost and tariff frictions suggest that other alternative trade policy instruments such as export
subsidies may have important welfare consequences, too.
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Table 4: Country characteristics for the year 2000.
Openness Tariff Tariff Multiplier
rate revenue
Australia 11.1% 10.9% 1.2% 1.012
Austria 25.6% 2.1% 0.5% 1.005
Belgium 37.8% 2.1% 0.8% 1.008
Brazil 6.7% 12.7% 0.8% 1.009
Bulgaria 21.9% 2.1% 0.5% 1.005
Canada 21.7% 1.3% 0.3% 1.003
China 8.3% 14.6% 1.2% 1.012
Cyprus 36.9% 2.1% 0.8% 1.008
Czech Republic 27.3% 2.1% 0.6% 1.006
Denmark 25.7% 2.1% 0.5% 1.006
Estonia 39.5% 2.1% 0.8% 1.009
Finland 17.6% 2.1% 0.4% 1.004
France 15.2% 2.1% 0.3% 1.003
Germany 18.5% 2.1% 0.4% 1.004
Greece 24.1% 2.1% 0.5% 1.005
Hungary 35.5% 2.1% 0.8% 1.008
India 8.0% 27.5% 2.2% 1.023
Indonesia 15.7% 5.2% 0.8% 1.008
Ireland 41.9% 2.1% 0.9% 1.009
Italy 13.5% 2.1% 0.3% 1.003
Japan 5.2% 2.8% 0.1% 1.001
Korea 17.9% 5.9% 1.1% 1.011
Luxembourg 53.9% 2.1% 1.2% 1.012
Malta 53.5% 2.1% 1.1% 1.012
Netherlands 33.0% 2.1% 0.7% 1.007
New Zealand 14.8% 2.5% 0.4% 1.004
Norway 17.8% 1.1% 0.2% 1.002
Poland 17.6% 2.1% 0.4% 1.004
Portugal 21.5% 2.1% 0.5% 1.005
Romania 20.1% 2.1% 0.4% 1.004
Russian Fed. 14.3% 8.8% 1.3% 1.013
Slovak Republic 31.3% 2.1% 0.7% 1.007
Slovenia 29.2% 2.1% 0.6% 1.006
South Africa 14.3% 4.8% 0.7% 1.007
Spain 17.0% 2.1% 0.4% 1.004
Sweden 21.4% 2.1% 0.5% 1.005
Switzerland 22.7% 1.4% 0.3% 1.003
Turkey 16.7% 5.4% 0.9% 1.009
United Kingdom 16.0% 2.1% 0.3% 1.003
United States 7.7% 1.8% 0.1% 1.001
Vietnam 28.6% 18.2% 5.2% 1.055
Mean 22.6% 4.3% 0.8% 1.008
Median 20.1% 2.1% 0.6% 1.006
Std. Dev. 11.7% 5.3% 0.8% 0.009
Notes: Openness: Constructed from the OECD Input-Output Database as im-
ports over gross output; see ACR. Tariff rates: Trade-weighted average tariff
rates come from World Development Indicators. For India, Korea, Russian Fed-
eration, South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam, tariff rates are missing for the year
2000 and are replaced by average tariff rates for the years 1999 and 2001. Tariff
revenue: Tariff revenue as a percentage of gross output. Tariff multiplier:
Calculated from the tariff revenue share; see equation (6).
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Table 5: Sensitivity analysis: Different measures of openness (year 2005).
Tariff Tariff Openness Icebergs Icebergs Under-
rate revenue only and tariffs estimation
Imports VA Imports VA Imports VA Imports VA
Australia 3.1% 0.3% 11.0% 17.3% 3.9% 6.4% 4.4% 6.9% 11.9% 7.7%
Austria 1.8% 0.5% 27.3% 25.5% 10.9% 10.0% 11.7% 10.8% 7.1% 7.6%
Belgium 1.8% 0.7% 36.7% 27.7% 15.9% 11.1% 17.1% 12.2% 6.8% 9.2%
Brazil 7.1% 0.5% 6.6% 8.8% 2.2% 3.0% 2.9% 3.8% 24.1% 19.0%
Canada 1.5% 0.3% 20.1% 22.4% 7.5% 8.5% 8.0% 9.0% 5.8% 5.2%
Chile 3.9% 0.7% 18.4% 25.2% 6.8% 9.8% 7.9% 11.0% 14.2% 10.5%
China 4.8% 0.5% 10.8% 17.1% 3.8% 6.2% 4.6% 7.1% 17.6% 11.6%
Czech Republic 1.8% 0.5% 27.7% 32.4% 11.1% 13.5% 11.9% 14.3% 7.1% 6.0%
Denmark 1.8% 0.5% 26.9% 22.7% 10.7% 8.7% 11.5% 9.5% 7.1% 8.4%
Estonia 1.8% 0.7% 38.9% 42.4% 17.3% 19.6% 18.5% 20.8% 6.7% 6.1%
Finland 1.8% 0.4% 19.2% 21.9% 7.2% 8.3% 7.7% 8.9% 7.3% 6.4%
France 1.8% 0.3% 14.9% 18.3% 5.4% 6.7% 5.8% 7.2% 7.4% 6.1%
Germany 1.8% 0.4% 19.8% 18.7% 7.4% 6.9% 8.0% 7.5% 7.3% 7.7%
Greece 1.8% 0.4% 20.3% 25.0% 7.6% 9.8% 8.2% 10.4% 7.3% 5.9%
Hungary 1.8% 0.6% 32.3% 30.5% 13.5% 12.5% 14.5% 13.5% 6.9% 7.4%
India 13.4% 1.8% 13.2% 16.9% 4.7% 6.2% 7.5% 9.0% 37.3% 31.5%
Indonesia 4.4% 0.6% 14.1% 22.8% 5.0% 8.7% 6.0% 9.7% 16.1% 10.3%
Ireland 1.8% 0.6% 34.0% 28.9% 14.4% 11.7% 15.5% 12.7% 6.9% 8.2%
Israel 1.7% 0.4% 23.0% 24.7% 8.8% 9.6% 9.4% 10.2% 6.5% 6.0%
Italy 1.8% 0.2% 13.3% 16.8% 4.7% 6.1% 5.1% 6.5% 7.4% 5.9%
Japan 2.5% 0.2% 7.6% 10.2% 2.6% 3.5% 2.9% 3.8% 10.0% 7.7%
Korea 8.3% 1.3% 16.1% 21.2% 5.8% 8.0% 8.0% 10.2% 26.7% 21.3%
Luxembourg 1.8% 1.0% 53.2% 35.9% 27.9% 15.5% 29.8% 17.1% 6.3% 9.9%
Netherlands 1.8% 0.6% 33.9% 20.0% 14.3% 7.5% 15.4% 8.5% 6.9% 11.7%
Norway 1.7% 0.3% 18.8% 20.5% 7.0% 7.7% 7.5% 8.2% 6.7% 6.2%
Poland 1.8% 0.4% 19.0% 24.8% 7.1% 9.7% 7.6% 10.2% 7.3% 5.6%
Portugal 1.8% 0.4% 20.2% 26.9% 7.6% 10.7% 8.1% 11.3% 7.3% 5.4%
Slovak Republic 1.8% 0.6% 34.8% 40.9% 14.9% 18.5% 16.0% 19.7% 6.9% 5.8%
Slovenia 1.8% 0.6% 31.9% 32.2% 13.3% 13.4% 14.2% 14.4% 6.9% 6.9%
South Africa 5.5% 0.8% 13.8% 20.6% 4.9% 7.8% 6.1% 9.0% 19.3% 13.5%
Spain 1.8% 0.3% 15.9% 20.4% 5.8% 7.7% 6.2% 8.1% 7.4% 5.7%
Sweden 1.8% 0.4% 22.0% 21.9% 8.4% 8.3% 9.0% 9.0% 7.2% 7.3%
Switzerland 1.3% 0.3% 22.7% 25.6% 8.7% 10.1% 9.2% 10.5% 5.1% 4.5%
Turkey 1.5% 0.2% 13.5% 18.9% 4.8% 7.0% 5.1% 7.3% 6.1% 4.4%
United Kingdom 1.8% 0.3% 16.5% 21.3% 6.0% 8.1% 6.5% 8.5% 7.4% 5.7%
United States 1.6% 0.1% 8.3% 12.6% 2.9% 4.4% 3.1% 4.6% 6.6% 4.4%
Mean 2.8% 0.5% 21.6% 23.3% 8.6% 9.2% 9.5% 10.0% 10.1% 8.7%
Median 1.8% 0.4% 19.5% 22.2% 7.3% 8.4% 8.0% 9.2% 7.2% 7.1%
Std. Dev. 2.4% 0.3% 10.2% 7.4% 5.2% 3.6% 5.4% 3.8% 7.0% 5.4%
Imports: Openness measured as imports over gross output from input-output tables as in ACR. VA: Openness measured as foreign value
added embodied in domestic final demand in percent of GDP. Icebergs only: Gains from trade stem from a pure reduction of iceberg trade
costs. Icebergs and tariffs: Gains from trade stem from a reduction of iceberg trade costs and/or tariffs that is consistent with observed
shares of tariff revenue in GDP. Underestimation: Percentage amount of underestimation of Icebergs only relative to Icebergs and tariffs.
We set θ = 3.09 and σ = 2.25, which implies a iceberg trade cost elasticity of ε = −3.09 and a tariff elasticity of ζ = −4.562; see Crozet and
Koenig (2010) for empirical evidence on θ and σ.
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B Gravity
With preferences given by a symmetric CES aggregator function with elasticity of substitution σ > 1,







where pij (ω) is the c.i.f. price such that pij (ω) = piτ ijtji. We assume linear technologies such that
variable production cost per unit of output in country i is given by wi/ϕ (ω) .
B.1 Armington
Perfect competition and identical linear technology ϕ (ω) = 1 across varieties such that pi (ω) = wi. If













Note that, different to the standard treatment, τ ij and tji have the same elasticities ε = ζ = 1−σ because
trade flows are defined inclusive of tariff payments.
B.2 Eaton-Kortum
In a perfect competition Ricardian trade model with a continuum of varieties à la Eaton-Kortum (2002),
each countries productivity ϕ in producing a variety ω is Fréchet distributed with F (ϕ) = exp (−Tiϕ
−γ) ,
where Ti ≥ 1 measures the location (country i
′s lowest possibly productivity draw) the location and γ













Again, τ ij and tji have the same elasticities ε = ζ = −γ.
B.3 Melitz
Firms differ with respect to productivity ϕ which, in line with the literature, is assumed to follow a
Pareto distribution with c.d.f. Gi (ϕ) = 1− (ϕ/bi)
−θ
, where bi governs location and θ is the shape of the
distribution. Presence of a firm from i on a market j requires payment of fixed costs wjfij in terms of
labor from the destination country j. Only firms with ϕ ≥ ϕ∗ij will be earning sufficiently much revenue
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on market j to support market presence in the presence of fixed access costs. Under these conditions the





















The mass of potential entrants Ni and Nj are solved via a free-entry condition and turn out independent
from trade costs (tji, τ ji) and wages. Hence, in the Melitz case with Pareto-distributed productivity,
ε = −θ and ζ = 1− θ/ρ. Letting θ → σ−1 to close down the selection effect, the Melitz gravity equation
(19) collapses to the Krugman form with ε = ζ = 1− σ.
C Derivation of equation (11)




















which follows from the gravity equation given in (17). The price index reads


















Using the expression for the domestic expenditure share to substitute out the term in curly brackets and







Equation (11) follows from noting that ε = ζ = 1− σ and noting that Nj is independent of trade costs.













































with Γ [.] denoting the Gamma function. Again, equation (11) follows
from using the expression for the domestic expenditure share to substitute out the terms in curly brackets
and rearranging terms.
























The price index is given as
P 1−σj =
θ




























Ni represents the mass of firms from country i active in j con-












Using this expression, we can rewrite the price index as
1 =
θσ
























































Recalling that wjLj/Xj = µ
−1



























Equation (11) follows from noting that ε = −θ and ζ = 1− θ/ρ.
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D Decomposition of trade elasticities in Melitz






Ni is the mass of foreign






dϕ is average expenditure on imported varieties. Following
Head and Mayer (2013), the change in imports can be written as:29
d lnXij













































The extensive margin is the change in the mass of foreign exporters:
d lnNij










d ln τ ij
= −θ
d lnϕ∗ij
d ln τ ij
,
where the second equality follows from Pareto. The intensive margin is defined as the change in expen-
diture on already existing varieties. With CES preferences, expenditure in country j on a variety ϕ from







Hence, the intensive margin is given by 1− σ.30







θ − (σ − 1)
θ
.
Summarizing these observations, we obtain
d lnXij
d ln τ ij




d ln τ ij︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive margin
+ (σ − 1)
d lnϕ∗ij
d ln τ ij︸ ︷︷ ︸
compositional margin
.
29We index firms by their productivity ϕ, wheras Head and Mayer (2013) index firms by their unit input
coefficients 1/ϕ. Note that the trade elasticities reflect partial effects. In Head and Mayer (2013), wages, aggregate
spending, and the price index are hold constant. Aggregate spending and the price index drop from the gravity
restriction (R3’) as we consider relative imports.
30The trade elasticities reflect partial effects. In Head and Mayer (2013), wages, aggregate spending, and the
price index are hold constant. Aggregate spending and the price index drop from the gravity restriction (R3’) as
we consider relative imports.
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This expression can be extented to cover the case of tariffs. As we define imports inclusive of tariffs, the
intensive margin is the same for iceberg trade costs and tariffs.31 The key difference is the effect of trade
costs on the import cutoff.
In order to hold profits constant, an increase in iceberg trade costs leads to a proportionate increase
in the import cutoff:
d lnϕ∗ij
d ln τ ij
= 1.
Hence, the intensive and the compositional margin exactly cancel out, and the elasticity of imports with
respect to iceberg trade costs simplifies to
ε ≡
d lnXij
d ln τ ij
= −θ.










= σwjfij , (22)







As in the case of iceberg trade costs, an increase in the tariff raises the consumer price pij = piτ ijtji and
therefore lowers demand and revenue. In the case of iceberg trade costs, there is a countervailing effect
which is not present in the case of tariffs. For given demand, an increase in τ ij means that the firm has
higher revenue as it sells τ ij units per unit exported.

















= 1− σ − θ
σ
σ − 1







31In this respect, the Melitz (2003) resembles the other quantitative trade models that we consider which do
not feature a firm extensive margin.
32Importantly, the partial effect of tariffs on imports does not depend on whether fixed export cost are paid
in domestic or foreign labor. If exporting and importing matter, the right hand side of equation (22) reads
σwαi w
1−α
j fij . The expression in equation (22) is nested for α = 0.
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E Proof of proposition 2
For simplicity we suppress country indices in this Appendix. We can do so without causing confusion
because we refer only to domestic variables. We calculate derivatives of a function that contains absolute


















































which proves part (a) of the proposition.















where the inequality strictly holds if µ > 1. This proves part (b) of the proposition.
Part (c). Let ε = −θ and ζ = 1 − θ/ρ. Taking the first derivative of κ with respect to θ and ρ for



























































where the claim in part (c) of the proposition follow from noting that ρ and σ are positively correlated.
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F Proof of proposition 3
F.1 Part (a): Lowering iceberg trade costs in the presence of tariffs
































λ (t− 1) + 1− λ (t− 1)















λ (t− 1) + 1
− ζ
λ (t− 1)












λ (t− 1) + 1
)2
− 1 + ζ
λ2 (t− 1)
2




where the inequality follows from ε, ζ < 0.
F.2 Part (b). Lowering tariffs




























[λ (t− 1) + 1]−W (t− 1)
[
t− 1 + λ ∂t∂λ
]










[λ (t− 1) + 1]
2 .
Concavity requires














λ (1− λ) > 0,
where the second line follows from d lnλ = − (1− λ) ζd ln t.




, where ξ < 1 is a constant term that collects
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non-tariff trade barriers. Then, the inequality can be rewritten as
ε








ξtζ+1 + ξ−1t1−ζ + 2t
.






with f [1] = 0, limt→∞ f [t] = 0 for ζ < 1, and
∂f [t]
∂t
= ξ (t− 1) tζ−1
(
1 + ζ + (1− ζ) t−1
)
.
The function f [t] reaches its maxima at t = 1 and


























where the inequality follows from ξ < 1. Then, a sufficient condition for concavity is
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which holds under regularity condition that guarantees finite variance of the sales distribution (γ > 2).










(1 + ρ) (θ − ρ) < 1. (24)
The regularity condition that guarantees finite variance of the sales distribution is θ > 2. Another
regularity condition postulates θ > σ − 1 = ρ/ (1− ρ). A plot in the (θ, ρ)−space shows that the
inequality (24) holds for all feasible combinations of θ and ρ.
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